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Abstract
This paper investigates the effects of disinflation policies on key macroeconomic variables. Using
euro–area data and Structural VectorAutoregressions (SVARs), we first identify disinflation
shocks as the only shocks that drive the inflation rate (as well as other nominal variables) to a
lower level in the long–run. We find that in the immediate aftermath of a disinflation shock, the
euro–area enters in a persistent recession. At the same time, the real wage and the real interest
rate persistently increase. We then use the dynamic responses drawn from the SVAR model to
estimate a medium–scale DSGE model. Using the estimated model, we perform counterfactual
experiments. Our findings suggest that nominal wage rigidities and monetary policy gradualism
have both played a prominent role in the recessionary effect of disinflation shocks in the euro–
area.
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1 Introduction
Many economists suspect disinflation policies to be a cause of recession in industrialized countries.
For example, Ball (1994) argues that most of US downturns during the seventies and the beginning
of the eighties are associated with periods of monetary tightening aimed at reducing inflation. In
addition, it is commonly accepted that the Volker disinflation triggered one of the most severe
contraction in post World War II U.S. history (Erceg and Levin, 2003). What more, empirical
studies report sizeable output losses following a disinflation policy (see Ball, 1994, Cecchetti and
Rich, 2001).
The euro–area as a whole has gone through such disinflation episodes. Indeed, the annual inflation
rate dramatically fell from 12% in 1980 to 4% in the late nineties. In spite of differences, inflation
dynamics in individual euro–area countries all display a significant downward trend during this
period. This feature reflects either a more stable monetary policy (as in Germany) or an explicit
change in monetary policy (competitive disinflation in France, see Blanchard and Muet, 1993).
At the same time, unemployment sharply increased and real activity was depressed, especially so
during the beginning of the eighties. Obviously, these adverse effects may result from other factors
and/or shocks (for example oil price shocks in the late seventies). However, shocks to monetary
policy driving inflation down seem to be legitimate candidates. Indeed, as argued by Blanchard
(2003), changes, either transitory or permanent, in monetary policy can have large and long–lasting
effects on real activity, through very persistent changes in real factor costs.
The empirical literature based on Structural VectorAutoregressions (SVARs), usually reports a
delayed and hump–shaped response of real and nominal variables to monetary policy shocks. Typ-
ically, this literature focusses on transitory monetary policy changes, representing short–run devi-
ations from normal policy (see Christiano et al., 1999, for a thorough survey). Thus, these SVAR
models are not well suited to deal with permanent changes in inflation, as observed for many indus-
trialized countries and more specifically, for our purpose, in the euro–area during the eighties. Yet,
studying disinflation–induced recessions remains a highly attractive research topic. Indeed, many
researchers view the economy’s dynamic responses to disinflation shocks as a natural assessment
of monetary models’ empirical plausibility (e.g. Furher and Moore, 1995, Coenen and Wieland,
2005). This is even truer as standard New Keynesian models are usually thought to have trouble
reproducing such dynamics (Mankiw, 2001).
The aim of this paper is twofold. First, we propose a SVAR model with a minimal set of restrictions
in order to assess the dynamic effect of a permanent disinflation shock in the euro–area. Second,
we use the SVAR–based responses to this shock in order to estimate a medium–scale structural
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model. This estimated DSGE model is then used to perform various counterfactual experiments
designed to deepen our understanding of the effects of disinflation policy shocks.
In a first step, we follow the empirical strategy proposed by Bullard and Keating (1995) and adopted
by Andres et al. (2002), Dolado et al. (2000), and Vlaar (2004). This approach adapts that
proposed by Blanchard and Quah (1989) in the case of permanent supply shocks. The disinflation
shock is identified as the only shock that can exert a permanent effect on the long–run inflation level,
as well as other nominal variables that cointegrate with inflation. In our SVAR model which includes
both nominal and real variables, we obtain that the disinflation shock has long–lasting and negative
effects on real activity. In particular, output persistently decreases and its dynamic response is
negative during five years. Likewise, hours worked, consumption, and investment share a similar
pattern, with a deeper negative response for investment. At the same time, the nominal interest
rate displays such a short–run inertia that the real interest rate persistently increases. Moreover,
nominal wages appear stickier in the short–run than prices, so that the real wage persistently
increases too. Our results turn out to be robust to a number of perturbations to the benchmark
specification. The main insight that can be drawn from this empirical analysis is that the real cost
of the two factor inputs (capital and labor) seem to be associated with the disinflation–induced
recession, as suggested by Blanchard (2003).
In a second step, we inspect the disinflation mechanisms through the lenses of a medium scale
structural model a` la Smets and Wouters (2003, 2005). Following Ireland (2007), Smets and
Wouters (2005) and de Walque et al. (2007), the disinflation shock is modelled as a permanent
negative shock to the central bank’s inflation target. We use the estimated dynamic responses from
the SVAR model as moments to be matched by the DSGE model. More precisely, relying on a
limited estimation information method,1 we estimate a set of structural and policy parameters to
minimize the discrepancy between responses drawn from the SVAR model and their DSGE model
counterparts. Our estimation suggests that the model fits reasonably well the dynamic behavior
of aggregate data after a disinflation shock. To some extent, this is a surprising result, given the
alleged inability of New Keynesian models to reproduce such dynamics, according to Mankiw’s
(2001) criticism of this class of models.
Finally, armed with the estimated model, we perform various counterfactual experiments, in the
spirit of Boivin and Giannoni (2006), Smets and Wouters (2007), Christiano et al. (2007), and
1This method has its advantages and its limits. Since it concentrates exclusively on a particular observed phe-
nomenon, it does not specify the whole model’ stochastic structure (other shocks and/or mechanisms). At the same
time, the method does not pretend that the DSGE model represents the true Data Generating Process of actual data
but only a useful approximation for the question under study (see Driddi, Guay and Renault, 2006).
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Sahuc and Smets (2007). In doing so, we resort to the estimated DSGE model as a positive
assessment tool of disinflation policies. Indeed, as argued by Gal´ı and Gertler (2007), the DSGE
model can be used to run such experiments because it has explicit theoretical foundations. Our
goal consists in characterizing quantitatively the propagation channels and recessionary effects of
disinflation shocks. To this end, we pay particular attention to a single number called the sacrifice
ratio that measures the output loss required to eliminate permanently one point of inflation. We
thus make contact with a venerable literature that largely predates the current wave of DSGE
models (Gordon, 1982, Gordon and King, 1982, Okun, 1978).
We investigate two main issues related to disinflation policies. The first deals with nominal rigidities
and the second concerns the form of monetary policy during disinflation episodes. Both channels
have been rounded as the most likely suspects explaining disinflation–induced recessions, as shown
by Ball (1994). The greatest benefit of resorting to a DSGE model is our implied ability to analyze
the structural mechanisms at work after a disinflation shock. Our counterfactual DSGE experiments
show that the main mechanisms accounting for the level of the sacrifice ratio are: (i) nominal wage
rigidities in the form of the frequency of no adjustment and the degree of indexation and (ii) the
low speed of disinflation policy. These two channels contribute to persistent rises in the real wage
and the real interest rate during disinflation episodes.2
The paper is organized as follows. In a second section, we present the identification of disinfla-
tion shocks and the empirical results. A third section is devoted to presenting the medium–scale
structural model, the estimation results, and the counterfactual experiments obtained from the
estimated DSGE model. A last section offers some concluding remarks.
2 Identification of Disinflation Shocks
We first describe the SVAR model and the long–run restriction used to identify the disinflation
shocks. We then discuss our empirical findings with euro area data. Finally, we perform a robustness
analysis on the key identification restrictions used in the SVAR model.
2As argued by Blanchard (2003), to the extent that employment and physical capital are complementary inputs,
the fall in investment might translate into an even deeper fall in the labor input. We investigated this issue within
the framework of our DSGE model by allowing for a less than 1 elasticity of substitution between labor and capital.
For reasonable values of this elasticity, i.e. in the range [0.5, 1], this mechanism does not quantitatively contribute to
reinforcing the recessionary effects of disinflation policies.
4
2.1 The SVAR Model
In order to identify the disinflation shock, we use the following procedure. Let the vector Zt include
the aggregate variables we are interested in. We assume that the stochastic process for Zt is of the
form
Zt = A0 +
∑`
i=1
AiZt−i + ut (1)
where ` is the number of lags and ut is a zero mean disturbance with covariance matrix Σ. In the
subsequent experiment, we select ` using standard information criteria.
Model (1) is estimated using euro–area quarterly data. The sample runs from 1970:1 to 2004:4.
The choice of variables in Zt implies a trade-off. On the one hand, we would like to include as many
variables as possible. However, this would imply estimating a very large number of parameters in
a finite sample, thus yielding very imprecise estimates of the responses to a disinflation shock. On
the other hand, a regression featuring too few variables in Zt could be corrupted by an omitted
variable bias. We therefore choose to adopt an intermediate empirical strategy. In our benchmark
experiment, Zt includes the following seven variables: the cyclical component of real per capita
output (yˆt), the log of the consumption-output ratio (ct − yt), the log of the investment-output
ratio (xt− yt), the cyclical component of total hours worked per capita (hˆt), the inflation rate (pit),
the short–run nominal interest rate (Rt), and wage inflation (pi
w
t ). Except for hours worked and
population, all the data are extracted from the AWM database compiled by Fagan et al. (2005).
The consumption–output ratio is measured as the ratio of real private consumption expenditures
(including nondurables, services, and durables expenditures) to real GDP. The investment–output
ratio is defined as the ratio of real gross investment to real GDP. We measure inflation using
the growth rate of the Harmonized Index of Consumer Prices (HICP). As is well known, this is
the price monitored by the European Central Bank (ECB) and also the price which served to
define the requirements to participate to the euro zone. Indeed, as reported in ECB (2004),“The
Governing Council of the ECB has defined price stability in terms of the HICP for the euro area.”
In addition, this was also the price index monitored by the Deutsch Bundesbank prior to adopting
the single currency. It is thus legitimate to use this price for the purpose of identifying the effects of
disinflation policy shocks. Wage inflation is simply the growth rate of nominal wage compensation.3
The population series is the working age population for the euro–area, extracted from the OECD
Economic Outlook. Total hours worked are extracted from the Groningen database.4 The hours
3The AWM mnemonics are as follows. Real output: YER, real consumption expenditures: PCR, real gross
investment: ITR, nominal wage: WRN, short–run nominal interest rate: STN.
4These data are available at the website http://www.ggdc.net/.
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data are only available at annual frequency. Therefore, we resort to the Chow and Lin (1971) time
disaggregation procedure to convert the series to quarterly frequency. More precisely, the growth
rate of total hours is converted to quarterly frequency using the growth rate of employment as
the informative covariate. The rationale for doing this is that the bulk of total hours variability
is suspected to emanate essentially from changes in employment, as shown by Gal´ı (2005) for the
cases of Germany and France.
In our benchmark specification, we adopt the following definitions. The cyclical component of
output, yˆt, is the residual of a regression of the log of real per capita GDP on a constant and a
linear trend. The cyclical component of total hours, hˆt, is obtained as the residuals of a regression
on a quadratic trend. The latter is meant to capture low frequency movements in hours worked
that are attributable to institutional and/or demographic features. Our results are also robust
to a specification with the raw level of hours. However, such a specification yields much wider
confidence intervals.
For the purpose of identifying disinflation shocks, it is important to assess, as a preliminary step,
whether inflation and other nominal variables can be characterized as integrated processes of order
one over the sample period.5 To do so, we perform several Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) tests
of unit root. More precisely, for each nominal variable, we regress the growth rate on a constant,
the lagged level, and lags of the first difference. In each case, the number of lags is selected using
standard information criteria. The ADF test statistic is equal to -1.52 for inflation, -2.01 for wage
inflation, and -1.67 for the short–run nominal interest rate. The null hypothesis of a unit root
thus cannot be rejected at the 10 percent level. Conversely, the null hypothesis of a unit root for
nominal variables in first difference is rejected at conventional levels. We also investigate if there
exist long–run relationships among nominal variables. To do this, we perform ADF tests on the
ex–post real interest rate and real wage growth. While the difference between wage inflation and
inflation unambiguously appears to be stationary (ADF test statistic of -3.91), we obtain mixed
evidence when it comes to the ex-post real interest rate. An ADF test rejects its stationarity
at conventional levels, but a Phillips–Perron test with a Bartlett correction is supportive of this
hypothesis. Given our emphasis on a structural interpretation of disinflation shocks, we choose
to impose the cointegration restrictions among nominal variables. The vector Zt is accordingly
specified as follows:
Zt = (∆pit, yˆt, ct − yt, xt − yt, Rt − pit, hˆt, pi
w
t − pit)
′, (2)
5We hasten to add that we view our results as a useful statistical approximation of inflation dynamics over this
sample period. It is of course harder to make such an assumption for longer datasets or in the face of stable monetary
policy, such as witnessed over the recent period.
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where ∆ stands for the first–difference operator. Building on these empirical results, we follow
Bullard and Keating (1995) and identify the disinflation shock as the only shock having a permanent
effect on inflation (see also Andres et al., 2002, the working paper version of Coenen and Vega,
2001, Dolado et al., 2000, and Vlaar, 2004, for similar SVAR setups). This is similar in practice
to the identification strategy originally proposed by Blanchard and Quah (1989) in the context of
supply shocks. Formally, let us define B(L) = (Im −A1L− · · · −A`L
`)−1, where Im is the identity
matrix and m is the number of variables in Zt. Now, we assume that the canonical innovations
are linear combinations of the structural shocks ηt, i.e. ut = Sηt, for some non singular matrix
S. As usual, we impose an orthogonality assumption on the structural shocks, which combined
with a scale normalization implies E{ηtη
′
t} = Im. Since we are only identifying a single shock, we
need not impose a complete set of restrictions on the matrix S. Let us define C(L) = B(L)S.
Given the ordering of Zt in eq. (2), we simply require that C(1) be lower triangular, so that only
disinflation shocks can affect the long-run level of inflation. This amounts to imposing that C(1)
be the Cholesky factor of B(1)ΣB(1)′. Given consistent estimates of B(1) and Σ, we easily obtain
an estimate for C(1). Retrieving S is then a simple task using the formula S = B(1)−1C(1).
2.2 Results
The lag–length ` = 2 in the SVAR is selected according to the Hannan-Quinn criterion (HQ). We
compute confidence intervals by standard bootstrap techniques.6 To simplify the interpretation,
we report the dynamic responses of consumption, investment, inflation, the short–run nominal
interest rate, and wage inflation. This requires that these variables be reconstructed from the
dynamic responses of Zt. All the dynamic responses are reported in Figure 1, together with the
associated confidence bands. These responses, which represent the key facts that we want to match
later, are normalized so that inflation is permanently reduced by 1%.
Let us first consider the responses of nominal variables. Inflation starts by sharply declining and
then surges before slowly converging to its lower new long–run value. At the same time, the nominal
interest rate is almost unresponsive on impact, then gradually declines, and slightly overshoots its
new steady state value. This implies a significant rise in the real interest rate in the immediate
aftermath of the disinflation shock. In the short–run, wage inflation decreases at a slower pace than
6We start by computing N = 1000 bootstrap replications of the structural VAR. First, let {ut}
T
t=1 denote the
canonical VAR residuals. We construct N new time series residuals {ut(i)}
T
t=1, i = 1, ..., N , where the tth element
of {ut(i)}
T
t=1 is drawn with replacement from {ut}
T
t=1. Using the estimated VAR coefficients and initial historical
conditions, we then construct N time series of Zt, {Zt(i)}
T
t=1. For each replication, the VAR specified in eq. (1) is
estimated and the impulse responses computed using the bootstrap analog of S.
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Figure 1: Impulse Response Functions
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Notes: The gray area corresponds to the 90% confidence interval obtained by standard bootstrap techniques. For ease
of interpretation, the size of the disinflation shock is normalized so as to generate an asymptotic inflation decrease by one
percentage point.
that of inflation, implying a rise in the real wage after a disinflation shock. In the medium–run,
inflation and wage inflation share very similar patterns.
When it comes to the real variables, we obtain the following results. First of all, let us consider
the dynamic response of the cyclical component of output. As is clear, the disinflation shock has a
long–lasting, negative, and significant effect on output. More precisely, a one percent asymptotic
decrease in inflation translates into approximately a 1.5% decline in output after about five quarters.
After five years, this response is still negative. These dynamic responses imply large sacrifice ratios,
defined as the cumulated responses of output divided by the annualized decrease in inflation (here,
4%). Indeed, after five years, the sacrifice ratio is estimated to be 4.26% of cumulated forgone
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output, with a standard error of 2.37, thus making the output loss significant at the 10% level.7
Overall, consumption declines by almost the same amount as output. This result can be explained
in part by the fact that available data on consumption include durable goods expenditures. In
contrast, investment experiences a drop more than twice as large as that of output. To gain some
intuition, it is instructive to consider the response of the ex-ante real interest rate (not reported).
The ex-ante rate is obtained as the difference between the nominal rate and the one-step ahead
expected response of inflation, using the expected inflation rate implied by the SVAR model. The
real rate displays a positive, persistent, and significant response to a disinflation shock. This
suggests that disinflation policies have persistently increased the real cost of capital, thus leading
to large declines in investment. Finally, hours worked do not react much on impact but display
an inverted hump–shaped pattern in the subsequent periods. As for output, the disinflation shock
has negative and significant long–lasting effects on hours worked. This dynamic response can be
interpreted as the direct consequence of the persistent increase in the real wage. These patterns of
dynamic responses to the disinflation shock are broadly consistent with previous results found in
the literature, especially Vlaar (2004) and the working paper version of Coenen and Vega (2001).
Notice, though, that we obtain deeper and more persistent recessionary effects.
Our strategy for estimating the parameters of the subsequent DSGE model focuses on only that
fraction of aggregate dynamics due to disinflation shocks. As a preliminary step, it is thus important
to assess how large is this fraction. To do so, we compute the contribution of the disinflation
shock to the variance of the seven variables included in model (1). Table 1 reports the variance
decomposition at different horizons. Concerning the nominal variables, the disinflation shock is the
dominant source of their fluctuations, even in the short–run, except maybe for the nominal interest
rate. For example, this shock accounts for more than 60% of inflation, more than 30% of the nominal
interest rate, and more than 27% for wage inflation after four quarters. At longer horizons, the
shock mechanically explains all the fluctuations in the nominal variables, by construction. Though
our identification strategy imposes long–run neutrality of monetary policy shocks, the disinflation
shock has a sizeable effect on real variables. It accounts for more than 10% of the variance of
the cyclical component of output and hours, and 25% for investment after four quarters. This
contribution is smaller for consumption (roughly 6%). At longer horizons, say after ten years, this
contribution is in between 10% and 20% for the real variables. This reflects the gradual response of
the production sector to monetary policy shocks. To sum up, even though the disinflation shocks
7Our finding departs from those of Cecchetti and Rich (2001) who obtain very imprecise estimates of the sacrifice
ratio in a four–variable SVAR model. Notice however that the sample data is not the same and their long-run
restriction is imposed on real output. In our framework, these restrictions are imposed on nominal variables rather
than on real variables.
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Table 1. Percentage Variance due to Disinflation Shock
Forecast Horizon
0 4 20 40
Inflation 59.90 63.09 82.20 89.14
[7.39, 81.17] [18.75, 80.73] [60.58, 88.86] [75.81, 93.57]
Output 0.05 11.51 12.37 11.54
[0.02, 16.59] [1.57, 34.15] [1.60, 37.28] [1.88, 36.15]
Consumption 0.06 6.07 7.87 7.56
[0.03, 19.77] [0.83, 32.61] [0.87, 37.12] [1.28, 35.48]
Investment 6.18 24.75 20.48 17.23
[0.06, 26.09] [2.93, 47.32] [2.30, 47.02] [2.53, 42.93]
Nominal Interest Rate 8.87 33.83 60.00 72.61
[0.21, 42.38] [8.65, 67.89] [33.84, 84.31] [54.69, 90.65]
Hours Worked 16.75 16.80 11.75 11.34
[0.31, 41.97] [0.45, 45.35] [0.86, 41.84] [1.12, 39.98]
Wage Inflation 0.12 27.17 62.64 75.88
[0.02, 15.23] [13.36, 38.38] [40.79, 71.26] [59.33, 82.80]
Notes: The figures in brackets are the 90% confidence interval, obtained by standard bootstrap
techniques.
might not represent the dominant source of aggregate fluctuations at business cycle frequencies,
they still account for a sizeable portion of these and thus constitute a legitimate object of study.
2.3 Robustness Analysis
The identification strategy adopted here calls for comments, pertaining essentially to the specifi-
cation of Zt in eq. (2).
8 Indeed, since Zt in eq. (2) includes other nominal variables that share
the same stochastic trend as inflation, our long–run restriction also imposes that only disinflation
shocks can exert a permanent effect on the nominal interest rate and wage inflation. In addition,
8Notice that the identification adopted here implies that disinflation shocks occur in each and every period. This
is in contrast with the narrative approach (see Romer and Romer, 1989 and 1994) which selects a small number
of episodes associated to an active disinflation policy. As noticed by Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (1999), an
advantage of the narrative approach is that the econometrician does not have to formally specify a monetary feedback
rule nor to impose a particular identification scheme to recover the responses of the economy. Such an approach is
not an option for us. Indeed, analogues of the FOMC minutes are not available from either National Central Banks
or the European Central Bank.
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by specifying the cyclical component of output and hours as deviations from deterministic trends,
we implicitly impose that disinflation shocks cannot have any long–run effect whatsoever on these
real variables. Moreover, by including the consumption–output ratio and the investment–output
ratio in Zt, we also impose that these variables share the same trend as output and, thus, that
the disinflation shocks cannot have any long–run effect on either consumption or investment. In
structural terms, the disinflation shocks can be interpreted as permanent monetary policy shocks
that are neutral in the long–run. This restriction is consistent with the monetarist dictum that
“inflation is always a monetary phenomenon in the long–run” (Friedman, 1968).
The restrictions documented above raise robustness problems. We examine these issues in various
dimensions: omitted variables in model (1) susceptible to affect inflation dynamics (for example,
the oil price), the definition of inflation (we replace the harmonized index of consumer prices by
the GDP deflator), the cointegration restrictions (wage inflation and the nominal interest rate are
specified in first difference), the sample period (we estimate the dynamic responses over a shorter
sample), the specification of output and hours (in first difference, allowing for permanent real
effect of disinflation shocks), and the monetarist dictum (allowing for an opportunistic approach to
disinflation, as in Ireland, 2007). Figure 2 summarizes all our robustness experiments and compares
them to our benchmark specification. This figure collects all the point estimates of the dynamic
responses. Though we do not report the associated confidence interval to save space, we place much
emphasis on the precision of the estimated responses.9 In all cases, the number of lags is selected
according to the HQ criterion.
One may legitimately argue that the decrease in the inflation rate during the eighties can be
attributable to the large decrease in oil price in the mid–eighties. To control for this decrease, we
include the growth rate of the oil price as an additional variable in the SVAR model. This price
is computed as the product of the West Texas Crude Oil Price and the nominal Euro–$ exchange
rate. Figure 2 (“Oil Price”) shows that the dynamic responses are undistinguishable from those of
the benchmark specification. We also investigate whether the estimated disinflation shock in our
benchmark specification of the SVAR model is correlated with oil inflation and Granger caused by
this variable. The contemporaneous correlation between the estimated disinflation shock and oil
inflation is almost zero. Moreover, when we perform a Granger causality test, we obtain a large
P–value for the null hypothesis on non–causality.
We now use the GDP deflator instead of the harmonized index of consumer prices in our definition
of inflation in the vector Zt. The results are left unaffected. Notice that, in comparison to the
9A technical appendix collecting and documenting this robustness analysis is available from the authors upon
request.
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Figure 2: Dynamic Responses under Different Specifications
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benchmark case, we obtain confidence intervals that are a little bit wider. This suggests that the
GDP deflator and the HICP not only share the same long–run behavior but also share similar
short–run dynamic patterns.
In the benchmark case, the SVAR model is estimated for the period 1970:1-2004:4. We investigate
if the estimated dynamic responses are sensitive to the choice of sample period. We consider a
shorter sample that covers the period 1980:1–2004:4. For this sample, the selected lag in the SVAR
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model is equal to one. As shown in Figure 2 (“Short–sample”), the results are almost the same
but the responses are less precisely estimated (this is especially true for the estimated response of
hours).
Next, we relax the restriction that nominal variables share a single stochastic trend associated to
the disinflation shock. The vector Zt is accordingly re–specified as follows:
Zt = (∆pit, yˆt, ct − yt, xt − yt,∆Rt, hˆt,∆pi
w
t )
′
We maintain the specification for the cyclical component of output and hours as deviations from
deterministic trends and we use the same identification strategy for the disinflation shock as in the
benchmark model. We obtain that relaxing the cointegration restrictions on nominal variables only
slightly modifies our conclusions (see “No cointegration” in Figure 2). The noticeable difference
does not concern the shape of the dynamics responses, but their confidence intervals. Without
imposing a long–run restriction among nominal variables, the precision of the estimated dynamic
responses for both nominal and real variables dramatically decreases.
In our benchmark specification, the disinflation shock cannot have a permanent effect on real
variables. We relax this assumption and we now specify Zt as follows:
Zt = (∆pit,∆yt, ct − yt, xt − yt, Rt − pit,∆ht, pi
w
t − pit)
′
When the SVAR model is estimated for the whole sample (1970:1–2004:4), the disinflation shock
has a permanent detrimental effect on output, consumption, investment and hours worked (see
“Permanent Effect” in Figure 2). However, the estimated responses are very sensitive to the choice
of the sample period. When we estimate the model for the period 1980:1–2004:4, we find very
different results (see “Short Sample and Permanent Effect” in Figure 2). For this sample period,
the recessionary effect of the disinflation shocks is not permanent, in the sense that the estimated
responses go back to their initial values and are not significantly different from zero. This result is
in contrast with the benchmark case since the latter delivers robust estimates with respect to the
sample.
Finally, we relax the monetarist dictum, thus allowing for an opportunistic approach to disinflation.
Shocks that drive permanently average labor productivity (e.g. technology shocks) and hours
worked (e.g. permanent labor tax shocks, permanent preference shocks on labor supply) can have
a long–run effect on inflation as well as on other nominal variables. Using the same identification
strategy as before, we now specify the vector Zt as follows:
Zt = (∆(yt − ht),∆ht,∆pit, ct − yt, xt − yt, Rt − pit, pi
w
t − pit)
′
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With this ordering of Zt and the identification schemes contained in a lower triangular C(1), we
still maintain that the disinflation shock cannot have a long–run effect on output and hours worked
(and then on consumption and investment). Notice that this specification for Zt is similar to that
considered by Gal´ı (1999) for the sake of identifying technology shocks. Our findings are in line with
the previous experiment. When estimated on the sample 1970:1–2004:4, the estimated dynamic
responses differ from those obtained in the benchmark case (see “Opportunistic Approach”in Figure
2). Now, the disinflation shock has a positive effect on output, while all nominal variables still
decrease. In addition, the dynamic responses of real variables are not precisely estimated. Thus,
no–clear cut evidence can be obtained from this alternative specification. Moreover, these estimated
responses are not robust to the choice of sample. When the SVAR model is estimated on the shorter
sample (see “Short Sample and Opportunistic Approach” in Figure 2), we obtain a persistent
recessionary effect of the disinflation shock, in line with the estimations in the benchmark case.
In this case, the disinflation shock is moderately contaminated by shocks that drive permanently
labor productivity and hours, since the disinflation shock consistent with the monetarist dictum
still represents almost 70% of the variance of inflation in the long–run.
All in all, this robustness analysis gives us confidence in the dynamic effects of disinflation previously
identified. It remains to be seen whether a standard DSGE can match these moments.
3 Structural Analysis of Disinflation Shocks
We first briefly present the main ingredients of the DSGE model. We then discuss the estimation
strategy and the empirical results. Finally, we investigate the key mechanisms at work after a
disinflation shock using a counterfactual analysis.
3.1 The Medium-Scale Structural Model
In this section we briefly describe the structural model we will use in the subsequent quantitative
analysis.10 Households maximize a separable utility function in consumption and labor effort over
an infinite life horizon. Consumption appears in the utility function relative to a time-varying
internal habit that depends on past consumption. Each household provides differentiated labor
inputs. Monopoly power in the labor market results in an explicit wage equation and allows for
10It is a slightly modified version of the structural models presented in Smets and Wouters (2003, 2005). See also
Christiano et al. (2005). See the appendix for more details about the model and the stationarity–inducing variables
transformations.
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the introduction of sticky nominal wages as in the Calvo (1983) model (households are allowed
to reset their wage each period with an exogenous probability). Households rent capital services
to firms and decide how much capital to accumulate given certain costs of adjusting the capital
stock. The introduction of variable capital utilization implies that as the rental price of capital
changes, the capital stock can be used more or less intensively according to some cost schedule.
Firms produce differentiated goods, decide on labor and capital inputs, and set prices according to
the Calvo model. The Calvo model in both wage and price setting is augmented by the assumption
that prices and wages that are not re–optimized in a given period are partially indexed to past
inflation rates. Prices are therefore set in function of current and expected marginal costs, but are
also determined by the past inflation rate. The marginal cost of production depends on the wage
and the rental rate of capital. Similarly, wages also depend on past and expected future wages and
inflation. Finally, the model is closed with a Taylor-type rule with partial adjustment. Here, the
desired nominal interest rate is set in function of the inflation target, the inflation-gap (i.e. the
difference between actual inflation and the inflation target) and the output gap.
In what follows, we briefly describe the log-linearized version of the model. Since the inflation
target changes permanently, all nominal variables are deflated by this variable. Moreover, in this
model, the inflation target has no long–run effect on real variables, even though it can trigger very
persistent short–run dynamics for these variables.
The consumption equations:
(1− βb)(1 − b)λˆt = βb(Et{cˆt+1} − bcˆt)− (cˆt − bcˆt−1),
λˆt = R˜t + Et{λˆt+1 − p˜it+1 −∆pˆi
?
t+1}.
The marginal utility of wealth λˆt is a weighted average of present, past, and expected future
consumption (cˆt).
11 In turn, λˆt is linked to the ex-ante real interest rate R˜t − Et{p˜it+1 + ∆pˆi
?
t+1}.
Here, R˜t represents the nominal interest rate in deviation from the inflation target pˆi
?
t (R˜t ≡ Rˆt−pˆi
?
t ).
Similarly, p˜it denotes the inflation gap (p˜it ≡ pˆit−pˆi
?
t ). The parameter b captures the degree of internal
habit formation in consumption and lies between zero and one. Finally β is the subjective discount
factor.
The capital accumulation equation:
kˆt+1 = (1− δ)kˆt + δıˆt
11Here and the remainder of the paper, a variable with a hat refers either to a percentage deviation from steady
state or to the natural logarithm of a gross rate. With a slight abuse of notation, we also use hats to denote logarithms
of non stationary variables.
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The capital stock kˆt depreciates with a constant rate δ. Here, ıˆt denotes investment.
The investment equation:
κ(ˆıt − ıˆt−1)− βκEt{ıˆt+1 − ıˆt} = pˆk,t.
Investment ıˆt depends on past and expected future investment and the value of the existing capital
stock pˆk,t. The parameter κ is related to the elasticity of the investment adjustment costs.
The Q equation:
Et{[1 − β(1− δ)]rˆ
k
t+1 + [β(1 − δ)]pˆk,t+1 + λˆt+1} = λˆt + pˆk,t,
The value of the capital stock depends negatively on the ex-ante real interest rate (λˆt − Et{λˆt+1})
and positively on its expected future value and on the expected real rental rate rˆkt+1.
The price inflation equation:
p˜it − γpp˜it−1 =
(1− βαp)(1− αp)
αp
sˆt + βEt{(p˜it+1 − γpp˜it)}+ γpζt,
The inflation gap p˜it depends on its past and expected future values and on the current real marginal
cost sˆt. The parameter αp is the probability that prices cannot be reset in a given period while
γp is the degree of indexation of prices to past inflation. Finally, the residual variable ζt obeys the
relation ζt ≡ βEt{∆pˆi
?
t+1} −∆pˆi
?
t .
The factor prices, real marginal cost, and utilization equations
sˆt = wˆt − φ(uˆt + kˆt − hˆt),
sˆt = rˆ
k
t − (φ− 1)(uˆt + kˆt − hˆt),
rˆkt = σauˆt.
The real wage wˆt and the rental rate of capital rˆ
k
t are linked to the real marginal cost according to
the above equations. Here, uˆt is the utilization rate of capital and hˆt denotes the labor input. The
parameter φ stands for the elasticity of output to the capital stock. The last equation determines
the optimal degree of utilization uˆt according to the real rental rate rˆ
k
t and the curvature of the
utilization cost function, σa.
The wage inflation equation:
p˜iwt − γwp˜it−1 =
(1− βαw)(1− αw)
(1 + ωθw)αw
(ωhˆt − λˆt − wˆt) + βEt{p˜i
w
t+1 − γwp˜it}+ γwζt,
Nominal wage inflation (in deviation from the inflation target) p˜iwt ≡ pˆi
w
t − pˆi
?
t is a function of its
expected future value, past and present inflation gaps, as well as on the wage gap ωhˆt − λˆt − wˆt.
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Here the parameter γw accounts for the degree of indexation of nominal wages to lagged inflation.
The parameter αw is the probability that nominal wages cannot be reset in a given period; ω and θw
denote the inverse elasticity of labor supply and the labor demand elasticity, respectively. Finally,
inflation and wage inflation are linked together according to the identity p˜iwt = p˜it + wˆt − wˆt−1.
The goods market equilibrium conditions:
yˆt = sccˆt + (1− sc)ˆit + φuˆt,
yˆt = µpφ(uˆt + kˆt) + µp(1− φ)hˆt.
The first equation is the resource constraint which links consumption, investment and utilization
expenditures (φuˆt) to aggregate output yˆt. Here sc is the steady state consumption-output ratio.
The second equation is the production function. Because of the presence of fixed costs in production,
the elasticity of aggregate production with respect to capital is µpφ instead of φ, where µp is the
price markup. The fixed cost parameter is pinned down so that the share of aggregate profits in
output is zero in a deterministic steady state.
The monetary policy reaction function:
Rˆt = ρRˆt−1 + (1− ρ)[pˆi
?
t + app˜it + ayy˜t].
This equation is a generalized Taylor rule featuring nominal interest rate smoothing at rate ρ and a
variable inflation target pˆi?t . The parameters ap and ay govern the sensitivity of the desired nominal
interest rate to the inflation gap p˜it and the output gap y˜t = yˆt− yˆ
n
t , where yˆ
n
t represents the natural
rate of output. This variable corresponds to the level of output obtained in an economy without
nominal frictions, given the inherited capital stock, as in Woodford (2003). This equation ensures
that (up to a constant term ignored here), any permanent change in the inflation target is reflected
one to one in the nominal interest rate in the long–run. The stationary version of this equation is
R˜t = ρR˜t−1 + (1− ρ)[app˜it + ayy˜t]− ρ∆pˆi
?
t .
Following Ireland (2007), Smets and Wouters (2005) and de Walque, Smets and Wouters (2006),
the inflation target pˆi?t is assumed to follow a random walk
12
∆pˆi?t = σ
?
t
where σ > 0 and 
?
t is a zero mean and unit variance innovation to the inflation target. In what
follows, we will investigate the quantitative effects of an unexpected decrease in ?t .
12In the recent empirical literature, a similar specification has been widely adopted, see, e.g., Stock and Watson
(2007) and Cogley and Sargent (2007).
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Obviously, as there was no single monetary policy (either in terms of adjustment speed, of inflation
target or in terms of responsiveness to the economic environment) in the euro–area over the whole
estimation sample adopted in our paper, the above specification warrants some words of caution.
The latter is meant as a useful practical simplification of a much more complex decision making
process.
3.2 Econometric Methodology and Estimation Results
We now turn to the estimation of the medium-scale structural model. Following Rotemberg and
Woodford (1997) and Christiano et al. (2005), we adopt a Minimum–Distance Estimation technique
of the structural parameters.13 The basic idea of this method is to select the value of structural
and monetary policy parameters so as to minimize the discrepancy between theoretical dynamic
responses and their SVAR counterparts.
More formally, let ψ denote the whole set of model parameters. We partition ψ in two groups,
ψ = (ψ′1, ψ
′
2)
′. Let ψ′1 ≡ (β, ω, θp, θw, δ, φ, σ) regroup the parameters calibrated prior to estimation.
We set β = 0.99, implying a steady–state annualized real interest rate of 4 percent. We impose
ω = 2, a value similar to that obtained by Smets and Wouters (2003). The elasticity of demand
for goods θp is set to 6, while that of labor demand θw is 11, which are quite conventional in the
literature. The depreciation rate is δ = 0.025 and the elasticity of output with respect to capital
is φ = 0.36. Finally, the parameter σ associated to the disinflation shock is set to 1% as in the
SVAR model. Indeed, for the selected horizon of dynamic responses drawn from the SVAR model
(20 quarters), all nominal variables have approximately converged to their new long–run values.
Let ψ2 ≡ (γp, γw, αp, αw, b,κ, σa, ρ, ap, ay)
′ regroup all the remaining free parameters. The latter
are estimated by minimizing a measure of the distance between the empirical responses of Zt and
their model counterparts. We define θj the vector of responses of the variables in Zt to a disinflation
shock at horizon j ≥ 0, as implied by the above SVAR. Then, the object which we seek to match
is θ = vec([θ0, θ1, . . . , θk])
′ where k is the selected horizon and vec(·) is an operator that stacks the
columns of a matrix. Then let h(·) denote the mapping from the structural parameters ψ2 to the
DSGE counterpart of θ. Our estimate of ψ2 is obtained by minimizing
(h(ψ2)− θˆT )VT (h(ψ2)− θˆT )
′.
where θˆT is an estimate of θ, T is the sample size, and VT is a weighting matrix which we assume is
the inverse of a matrix containing the asymptotic variances of each element of θ along its diagonal
13See also Altig et al. (2004), Amato and Laubach (2003), Boivin and Giannoni (2006) and Giannoni and Woodford
(2005) among many others.
18
Table 2. Structural Parameters
Parameters Value Interpretation
γp 0.000
(∗)
Price indexation parameter
γw 1.000
(∗)
Wage indexation parameter
αp 0.689
(0.674)
Proba. of no price reoptimization
αw 0.748
(0.075)
Proba. of no wage reoptimization
b 0.883
(0.090)
Habit parameter
κ 6.892
(5.227)
Adjustment cost parameter
σa 0.192
(0.388)
Curvature of the utilization cost function
ρ 0.775
(0.108)
Interest rate smoothing
ap 1.125
(1.770)
Interest rate elasticity wrt pˆit
ay 0.000
(∗)
Interest rate elasticity wrt yˆt
Notes: The values in parentheses are the standard errors. A star refers to a parameter which hit a
constraint during the course of the first stage estimation.
and zeros elsewhere. As suggested by Christiano et al. (2005), this choice of weighting matrix
ensures that the model-based dynamic responses lie as much as possible inside the confidence
interval of their SVAR-based counterparts.
The estimated structural parameters are reported in Table 2 and the estimated dynamic responses
of the structural model in Figure 1. Three parameters hit their constraint during the course of
estimation: the price indexation (γp = 0), the wage indexation (γw = 1) and the sensitivity of
the desired nominal interest rate to the output gap (ay = 0). The low price indexation is often
found in the literature on euro–area data (e.g. Smets and Wouters, 2003). When it comes to the
wage indexation mechanism, anticipating on our results, our finding suggests that a high value is
needed to match the recessionary effects of disinflation policies. This is consistent with the view
entertained by Gordon (1982), among others. Finally, setting ay = 0 is also a necessity for the
purpose of matching the recessionary effects of a disinflation shock, as will appear clearer in the
subsequent counterfactual analyses. This suggests that during disinflation periods, monetary policy
in the euro–area as a whole was conducted without any explicit concern for real activity.
The probabilities of no price (αp) and no wage (αw) reoptimization are smaller than previous
estimates (see Smets and Wouters, 2003, 2005). To some extent, this is not surprising since the
model is asked to explain what is left of inflation’s conditional persistence once inflation’s stochastic
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trend has been removed. Notice that the estimation results suggest more wage stickiness than
price stickiness. Recalll that, in addition, nominal wage inflation displays much more intrinsic
inertia than inflation since γw = 1 and γp = 0. The estimated value for the habit parameter
is large (b = 0.882) compared to previous findings with euro data. The investment adjustment
cost parameter (κ = 6.892) is not estimated precisely. The capital utilization cost parameter
(σa = 0.192) is very comparable to previous estimated values. The estimated smoothing parameter
in the interest rate equation is ρ = 0.775, suggesting a substantial level of policy inertia. It is
important to keep this result in mind for our counterfactual analysis. Finally, the sensitivity of
the desired nominal interest rate to the inflation gap (ap = 1.125) suggests a moderate response of
monetary policy. These results are broadly consistent with the estimates obtained by Clarida et al.
(1998) for the three main euro–area countries (Germany, France, Italy). For example, they report
Taylor rule coefficients for inflation ranging from 0.90 to 1.31 for these three countries.
Given these estimated values, the dynamic responses of the structural model are reported in Figure
1 (dashed line) together with those from the SVAR model and with the associated confidence
interval. This figure shows that the model mimics well the estimated dynamic responses from the
SVAR model, with the exception of inflation in the very short–run and consumption. For inflation,
this is because the model implies a persistent and smooth adjustment path, contrary to the data
which display sudden changes in the very short–run. For consumption, the difference might stem
from the data used in the SVAR model, since they include durable goods. For the other aggregate
variables, the structural model successfully reproduces the recessionary effects of the disinflation
shock, together with the short–run inertia of the nominal interest rate and the dynamic responses
of wage inflation. For example, the estimated structural model implies a large sacrifice ratio for
output (about 4.82) in accordance with actual data.
Thus, contrary to what one could have expected based on Mankiw’s (2001) criticism of New Key-
nesian models, a benchmark sticky prices–sticky wages model embedding a sufficient amount of
real frictions is able to mimic the aggregate dynamics triggered by a disinflation shock.
3.3 Counter–Factual Analyses of Disinflation Policy
Having shown that the medium–scale structural model replicates reasonably well the effects of a
permanent disinflation shock on a set of real and nominal variables, we now perform counterfactual
analyses. These quantitative experiments are conducted to shed light on the main mechanisms at
the core of the output cost of disinflation. Here, we use the estimated model as our benchmark
and we alter successively a single parameter or a set of parameters. We essentially concentrate our
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analysis on two issues that have been previously discussed in the context of disinflation policies.
The first issue concerns the role played by nominal rigidities, either on the labor or on the goods
markets. Indeed, as argued by Gordon (1982), nominal wage rigidities (low frequency of adjustment
and/or high degree of indexation) might be held responsible for deeper recessionary effects of
disinflation. Moreover, Mankiw (1990) argues that a higher degree of price rigidities contributes to
increasing the cost of disinflation. We investigate these candidate explanations by perturbing the
values of the wage indexation parameter (γw), the probability of no wage reoptimization (αw), and
the probability of no price reoptimization (αp).
The second important issue relates to monetary policy’s form, either in terms of adjustment speed
or responsiveness. The literature has largely dwelt on the central and controversial question of the
optimal speed of disinflation, i.e. the choice between “gradualism” and “cold turkey”. On the one
hand, a gradual disinflation is thought to be less costly because wages and prices display inertia
and cannot adjust quickly to a permanent and sudden change in monetary policy (see Taylor,
1983). On the other hand, Sargent (1983) argues that a quick disinflation is less costly because a
sharp regime change in monetary policy makes the new policy credible and thus changes downward
inflation expectations. Notice also that empirical studies suggest that the speed of disinflation
allows to reduce the sacrifice ratio (see Ball, 1994 and Boschen and Weise, 2001). Obviously, our
DSGE model abstracts from credibility problems and is not well suited to assess Sargent’s case for
the euro area. At the same time, a change in the monetary policy inertia parameter (ρ) in the
generalized Taylor rule is a practical modelling shortcut for investigating the speed of disinflation
issue. In addition, we inspect whether the responsivenesses of monetary policy to the inflation and
output gaps are key ingredients of a successful disinflation policy. We thus alter the sensitivities of
the desired nominal interest rate to the inflation and output gaps (ap and ay, respectively).
These various experiments are reported in figures 3 and 4. The figures show the dynamic responses
of inflation, output, consumption, investment, the nominal interest rate, hours worked, wage in-
flation, the real wage, and the real interest rate. In addition, for each counterfactual experiment,
we compute the sacrifice ratio as a simple way to compare the cost of disinflation. Recall that
this ratio is equal to 4.82 in the benchmark case. As before, we view the sacrifice ratio as a useful
summary statistic of the recession deepness.
Disinflation and nominal rigidities
We first impose γw = 0. In this case, the real wage does not depend on past inflation. This allows
us to asses if nominal wage indexation plays an important role in the dynamics of disinflation policy.
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Figure 3: Model-Based Counterfactual Analysis: Nominal Rigidities
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From Figure 3, we see that the long–lasting negative effect on real variables is weakened compared
to the benchmark case. In this experiment, the sacrifice ratio is approximately equal to 3.70. Hence,
a zero wage indexation allows to reduce the output cost of disinflation by roughly 15%. Inflation
and wage inflation share similar patterns, as they instantaneously drop by almost the same amount
after the policy shock. It follows that the real wage is weakly reactive in the short–run. This is
in contrast with the benchmark case, wherein the real wage persistently increases because of the
nominal wage inertia. As a consequence, setting γw = 0 implies that hours worked do not react
too much. However, the negative effect on other real variables is still present, because the nominal
interest rate displays higher inertia than inflation. Consequently, the real cost of capital increases
after the disinflation shock and remains persistently positive. Investment then persistently decreases
and thus output drops. This first experiment shows that labor market rigidities (in the form of
a nominal wage indexation scheme) have potentially exacerbated the output cost of disinflation
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policy.
Second, we consider a version of the medium–scale model in which wage stickiness is eliminated
while still maintaining price stickiness. The experiment is conducted by imposing γw = αw = 0.
We see in Figure 3 that a zero nominal wage rigidity dramatically reduces the output cost of
disinflation. The decrease in real output is now very short–lived. Consequently, the sacrifice ratio
is strongly reduced, since it is equal to 1.33, which implies a relative reduction by 69% with respect
to the benchmark case. In this model, the main mechanism at work is the large decrease in the
real wage, since nominal wage quickly falls in the short–run.
Third, we impose price flexibility (αp = 0), holding nominal wage stickiness fixed. This is a simple
way of assessing which of the two sources of nominal rigidity (wage or price) plays the biggest
part in the disinflation story. The sacrifice ratio is now equal to 4.82, which represents a relative
increase by 12 % with respect to the benchmark scenario. Indeed, in this version, the real wage
displays a positive inertia in the short–run, thus implying rigid marginal cost and a fall in the labor
input. This has a tendency to limit the speed at which inflation reaches its new steady state value.
As a consequence, the nominal interest rate responds in a more pronounced (and hump-shaped)
fashion than in the benchmark case, thus contributing to magnifying the decrease in investment,
consumption, and output.
Disinflation and monetary policy
We first examine the effect of nominal interest rate inertia (see Figure 4). We set ρ = 0, so that
the desired and actual nominal interest rates exactly coincide in every period. Our quantitative
finding suggests that a quick policy change results in a small recession. As mentioned before, in our
model, this obtains for other reasons than credibility issues. The lesser recessionary effect stems
here from the behavior of the real interest rate, as argued by Blanchard (2003). In our experiment,
we find that the contractionary effect of the disinflation shock is strongly reduced under ρ = 0.
The sacrifice ratio is now equal to 1.63, which implies a relative reduction of this cost by 62%, a
result quantitatively comparable to what obtains in the sticky price version of the model. This
result occurs even though the real wage persistently increases and hours worked drop. The reason
why is now that the real interest rate does not increase too much so that the fall in investment is
overcome and a higher utilization rate of capital is substituted for the labor input.
Second, we investigate the effect of a more agressive policy with respect to the inflation gap. We set
ap = 3 which represents a value twice as large as that commonly estimated for this parameter (see
Smets and Wouters, 2003, 2005). This policy parameter does not significantly alter the dynamics
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Figure 4: Model-Based Counterfactual Analysis: Monetary Policy
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compared to what obtained in the benchmark scenario, as can be seen from Figure (4). The sacrifice
ratio is now equal to 4.00, implying a reduction by a mere 7%. This reflects both the facts that
aggregate inflation exhibits a low degree of inertia and that agents have already indexed their price
to the new inflation target (recall that γp = 0). Thus, given a degree of monetary policy inertia,
increasing ap has little effect. In an economy with a higher intrisinc inflation inertia, increasing ap
would strengthen the recessionary effects because in such a setting, the inflation gap would increase
thus driving the nominal interest rate to even higher values.
Third, we consider a reactive monetary policy to the output gap. We set ay = 0.2 which represents
a value twice as large as conventional values for this parameter. Contrary to the previous case,
we obtain that the monetary policy sensitivity to real activity has a non zero effect on the cost
of a disinflation policy. The sacrifice ratio now falls to 3.61, close to what obtains when we set
γw = 0. In this case, the relative output cost reduction is equal to 16%. By paying attention to real
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economic activity, monetary authorities contribute to moderating the increase in the real interest
rate, but only to a modest extent.
4 Conclusion
This paper characterizes the dynamic responses of aggregate variables to a permanent disinflation
shock in the euro–area. Using a SVAR model, we obtain that this type of monetary policy has a
sizeable recessionary effect on aggregate variables. Our results show that a standard medium-scale
DSGE model, as currently much used in central banks, manages to match fairly well the impulse
responses drawn from the SVAR. While the SVAR embeds the sufficient amount of economic
theory needed to identify the disinflation shock, it is not well suited to give more than intuitions
as to the economic mechanisms responsible for the overall aggregate effects of these shocks. To
the contrary, the DSGE model offers a natural framework that lends itself to highlighting these
mechanisms, provided that it fits the data reasonably well. Indeed, our medium–scale DSGE model
turns out to capture reasonably well the aggregate dynamics triggered by a disinflation shock. Our
counterfactual exercises then show that the main mechanisms at work are the following: (i) nominal
wage rigidities in the form of frequency of no adjustment and the degree of indexation and (ii) the
speed of disinflation policy. Interestingly, our findings echo empirical results emphasized by Ball
(1994). As explained above, however, going to the hassle of specifying and estimating a DSGE
model has a high payoff in terms of structural interpretation of disinflation policies.
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Appendix
A Model Details
This appendix details the model components and carefully derives the loglinearized price and wage equations
appearing in the text.
A.1 Production Side and Price Setting
There is a unique aggregate good, yt, which can be used either for consumption or investment purposes.
The aggregate good is produced by competitive firms according to the technology
yt =
(∫ 1
0
yt(ς)
(θp−1)/θpdς
)θp/(θp−1)
(3)
where yt(ς) is the input of intermediate good ς, with ς ∈ [0, 1]. The representative aggregate good firm solves
the profit maximization program
max
{yt(ς)}
Ptyt −
∫ 1
0
Pt(ς)yt(ς)dς,
where Pt is the nominal price of the aggregate good and Pt(ς) is the nominal price of intermediate good ς.
Both are taken as given by the firm. The first order condition associated with profit maximization is
yt(ς) =
(
Pt(ς)
Pt
)−θp
yt.
Each intermediate good ς ∈ [0, 1] is produced by a monopolistic firm with the corresponding index. The
firm ς has the technology
yt(ς) = kt(ς)
φnt(ς)
1−φ − κ, (4)
where 0 < φ < 1 is the elasticity of production with respect to capital and κ is a fixed production cost.
The terms kt(ς) and nt(ς), denote, respectively, the inputs of capital and aggregate labor. We assume that
in each period of time, a monopolistic firm can reoptimize its price with probability 1− αp, irrespective of
the elapsed time since it last revised its price. If the firm cannot reoptimize its price, the latter is rescaled
according to the simple revision rule
PT (ς) = δ
p
t,TPt(ς), (5)
where
δpt,T =


∏T−1
j=t (pi
?
j+1)
1−γp(pij)
γp if T > t
1 otherwise
, (6)
where γp ∈ (0, 1) measures the degree of indexation to the most recently available inflation measure, pit is
the (gross) inflation rate and pi?t is the target (gross) inflation rate.
The real marginal cost of producing yt(ς) units of good ς is formally defined as
st =
(
rkt
φ
)φ(
wt
1− φ
)1−φ
,
where rkt is the real rental rate of capital and wt is the real wage rate. Notice that since capital and aggregate
labor are supplied in economy-wide markets, the real marginal cost does not depend on ς.
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Let y?t,T (ς) denote the production of firm ς at T if it last revised its price in period t. According to the
demand function for intermediate goods, y?t,T (ς) obeys the relationship
y?t,T (ς) =
(
δpt,TP
?
t (ς)
PT
)−θp
yT . (7)
Thus, if drawn to reoptimize in period t, firm ς selects P ?t (ς) so as to maximize the present discounted sum
of profit streams
Et
∞∑
T=t
(βαp)
T−tλT
λt


(
δpt,TP
?
t (ς)
PT
)1−θp
yT − sT
(
δpt,TP
?
t (ς)
PT
)−θp
yT

 ,
where βT−tλT /λt is the stochastic discount factor. The associated first order condition is
Et
∞∑
T=t
(βαp)
T−tλT
λt
y?t,T (ς)
[
δpt,T
pit,T
p?t (ς)− µp
(
y?t,T (ς)
yT
)
sT
]
= 0, (8)
where we made repeated use of eq. (7) to eliminate terms and defined
p?t (ς) ≡
P ?t (ς)
Pt
, pit,T ≡
PT
Pt
, µp ≡
θp
θp − 1
.
In steady state, we obtain the relation
p? = µps.
Notice in addition that in such a symmetric steady state, all producers face the same relative price, so that
p? = 1.
Loglinearizing (8) yields
Et
∞∑
T=t
(βαp)
T−t{δˆpt,T − pˆit,T + pˆ
?
t (ς)− sˆT } = 0. (9)
Rearranging this expression, we obtain
pˆ?t = (1 − βαp)Et
∞∑
T=t
(βαp)
T−t{[pˆit,T − δˆ
p
t,T ] + sˆT }. (10)
Notice that according to this expression, the reoptimized price does not depend on ς. We now quasi-difference
this expression, which implies
pˆ?t = (1− βαp)sˆt + βαpEt{pˆ
?
t+1}+ βαp(1 − βαp)Et
∞∑
T=t+1
(βαp)
T−(t+1){pˆit,T − δˆ
p
t,T − pˆit+1,T + δˆ
p
t+1,T }.
In order to simplify the above expression, notice that
pˆit,T − pˆit+1,T = pˆit+1, (11)
δˆpt+1,T − δˆ
p
t,T = −[(1− γp)pˆi
?
t+1 + γppˆit]. (12)
Now, let us define
p˜it = pˆit − pˆi
?
t ,
so that
pˆit,T − δˆ
p
t,T − pˆit+1,T + δˆ
p
t+1,T = pˆit+1 − (1− γp)pˆi
?
t+1 − γppˆit = p˜it+1 − γpp˜it + γp∆pˆi
?
t+1.
Using this, the above expression rewrites
pˆ?t = (1− βαp)sˆt + βαpEt−1{pˆ
?
t+1}+ βαpEt{p˜it+1 − γpp˜it + γp∆pˆi
?
t+1}.
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Making use of the relation defining the aggregate nominal price, we also obtain
1 = (1− αp)(p
?
t )
1−θp + αp
[
(pi?t )
1−γppi
γp
t−1
pit
]1−θp
.
Loglinearizing this expression yields
pˆ?t =
αp
1− αp
(p˜it − γpp˜it−1 + γp∆pˆi
?
t ).
Plugging this relation above, we finally get
p˜it − γpp˜it−1 = κpsˆt + βEt{p˜it+1 − γpp˜it}+ γpζt.
where
κp ≡
(1− βαp)(1 − αp)
αp
, ζt = βEt{∆pˆi
?
t+1} −∆pˆi
?
t
A.2 Households and Wage Setting
The economy is inhabited by differentiated households indexed on [0, 1], each of which is endowed with a
specific labor type of labor. The typical household υ seeks to maximize
Et
∞∑
T=t
βT {log(cT − bcT−1)− V (hT (υ))} (13)
subject to the constraints
PT [cT + iT + a(uT )kT ] +BT+1/RT =WT (υ)hT (υ) + ΘT + PT r
k
TuTkT +BT (14)
kT+1 = (1− δ)kT + iT (1− F (iT /iT−1)). (15)
Here ct, it, kt denote consumption, investment, and physical capital, respectively. The term ut denotes
the utilization rate of physical capital and a(ut)kt denotes the associated utilization cost, assumed to be
proportional to the capital stock; rkt is the rental rate of capital services and Wt(υ) is the nominal wage rate
paid to labor of type υ while ht(υ) is the quantity of type-υ labor supplied. Bt+1 is the quantity of nominal
bonds acquired at t, maturing at t + 1, and paying the gross nominal interest rate Rt. Finally Θt denotes
aggregate profits redistributed by the monopolistic firms to the households. We assume that a(u) = 0, where
u is the deterministic steady state value of ut. This implies that along the balanced growth path, there are
no costs associated to capital uilization. Similarly, we assume that F (1) = F ′(1) = 0, so that adjustment
costs vanish along a deterministic balanced growth path.
A typical household υ acts as a monopoly supplier of type-υ labor. Each household υ ∈ [0, 1] sells its labor
ht(υ) to a competitive firm which then combines these differentiated labor inputs into an aggregate labor
index ht. This is done through the technology
ht =
(∫ 1
0
ht(υ)
(θw−1)/θwdυ
)θw/(θw−1)
, (16)
where θw > 1 is the elasticity of substitution between any two labor types. Recall that Wt(υ) denotes the
nominal wage rate paid to type-υ labor, which labor intermediaries take as given. LetWt denote the nominal
wage paid to aggregate labor. Accordingly, the demand curve for labor of type υ is
ht(υ) =
(
Wt(υ)
Wt
)−θw
ht, (17)
where the aggregate nominal wage is defined as
Wt =
(∫ 1
0
Wt(υ)
1−θwdυ
)1/(1−θw)
. (18)
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Notice that equation (18) is a direct consequence of the combination of equation (17) and the zero profits
condition for labor intermediaries.
It is assumed that at each point in time only a fraction 1 − αw of the households can set a new wage,
which will remain fixed until the next time period the household is drawn to reset its wage. The remaining
households simply revise their wages according to the rule
WT (υ) = δ
w
t,TWt(υ), (19)
where
δwt,T =


∏T−1
j=t (pi
?
j+1)
1−γw(pij)
γw if T > t
1 otherwise
, (20)
where γw ∈ [0, 1] measures the degree of indexation to the most recently available inflation measure, pi
?
t is
the inflation target, and pit is gross inflation.
Let us now turn our attention to the wage setting decision and define h?t,T (υ) the supply of hours at T by
household υ if it last reoptimized its wage at t. In period t, if drawn to reoptimize, household υ chooses his
wage rate W ?t (υ) so as to solve
max
W?t (υ)
Et
∞∑
T=t
(βαw)
T−t
{
λT
δwt,TW
?
t (υ)
PT
h?t,T (υ)− V (h
?
t,T (υ))
}
The associated first order condition is
Et
∞∑
T=t
h?t,T (υ)(βαw)
T−th?t,T (υ)
{
λT
δwt,T
piwt,T
w?t (υ)
wt
wT −
θw
θw − 1
V ′(h?t,T (υ))
}
(21)
where w?t (υ) ≡W
?
t (υ)/Pt and pi
w
t,T ≡WT /Wt.
Loglinearizing this expression yields
Et
∞∑
t=T
(βαw)
T−t{λˆT + δˆ
w
t,T + wˆ
?
t (υ) + wˆT − wˆt − pˆi
w
t,T − ωhˆ
?
t,T (υ)} = 0, (22)
with
ω =
V ′′(h)h
V ′(h)
.
The optimal labor supply is defined by
h?t,T (υ) =
(
δwt,T
piwt,T
w?t (υ)
wt
)−θw
hT .
which implies
hˆ?t,T (υ) = hˆT − θw(δˆ
w
t,T − pˆi
w
t,T + wˆ
?
t (υ)− wˆt).
Combining these loglinearized expressions yields
Et
∞∑
T=t
(βαw)
T−t{λˆT + wˆT − ωhˆT + (1 + ωθw)(δˆ
w
t,T − pˆi
w
t,T + wˆ
?
t (υ)− wˆt)} = 0.
Since all households face the same constraints, it must be the case that W ?t (υ) doesn’t depend on υ. Thus,
we can drop the υ argument in the above equation. We finally obtain
wˆ?t − wˆt =
1− βαw
1 + ωθw
Et
∞∑
T=t
(βαw)
T−t{ωhˆT − λˆT − wˆT + (1 + ωθw)(pˆi
w
t,T − δˆ
w
t,T )}.
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Quasi-differencing this expression yields
wˆ?t − wˆt =
1− βαw
1 + ωθw
(ωhˆt − λˆt − wˆt) + βαwEt{wˆ
?
t+1 − wˆt+1}
+(1− βαw)(βαw)Et
∞∑
j=0
(βαw)
j{(pˆiwt,t+1+j − δˆ
w
t,t+1+j)− (pˆi
w
t+1,t+1+j − δˆ
w
t+1,t+1+j)}.
Now, notice that
δˆwt+1,t+1+j − δˆ
w
t,t+1+j = −[(1− γw)pˆi
?
t+1 + γwpˆit],
and that
pˆiwt,t+1+j − pˆi
w
t+1,t+1+j = pˆi
w
t+1.
Thus, following the exact same steps as before
p˜iwt − γwp˜it−1 = κw(ωhˆt − λˆt − wˆt) + βEt{p˜i
w
t+1 − γwp˜it}+ γwζt,
where
p˜iwt = pˆi
w
t − pˆi
?
t , p˜it = pˆit − pˆi
?
t , ζt = βEt{∆pˆi
?
t+1} −∆pˆi
?
t , κw =
(1− βαw)(1− αw)
(1 + ωθw)αw
.
Finally, wage inflation and inflation are linked together according to
p˜iwt = p˜it + wˆt − wˆt−1.
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